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ABSTRACT 
Employing an event study approach, the present authors analyse whether 
the Federal Reserve’s policy surprises affect the risk perceptions in the 
emerging markets. Only weak evidence is found when the Federal Reserve 
follows a more expansionary policy than expected. For all other cases, 
the policy surprises of the Federal Reserve are ineffective. 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
It has been well documented that the financial 
markets in the USA react strongly to the policy 
changes of the Federal Reserve (FED). After the 
FED explicitly stated that it would continue to 
tighten its policy also in the second half 2005, the 
interest on this issue gained further importance. 
In this context, Kuttner (2001) and Bernanke and 
Kuttner (2004) find that the reactions of the financial 
markets to a policy change are much stronger 
when the FED’s policy change is unanticipated, 
i.e. when there is a surprise component in the federal 
funds rate. 
 
This study extends the effects of these policy 
surprises to emerging market economies, which 
has not been investigated before. More specifically, 
it focuses on the changes in the perceived risk for 
these economies when there is a policy surprise by the 
FED. As the financial markets become more interconnected, 
these policy surprises can be critical for 
the emerging markets. While a more aggressive policy 
change than the expected can increase the risk 
premium that is demanded by the foreign investors 
to stay in these emerging markets and thus increases 
the risk perceptions, an expansionary policy surprise 
can generate capital flows to these markets, which 
decreases the country-specific risk component. 
 
As the next section elaborates, it analyzes the 
above-mentioned question for 12 emerging markets 
within an event-study framework by concentrating on 
the Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI) spread, 
prepared by the J. P. Morgan. Next, the rank test of 
Cragg and Donald (1997) is performed to identify 
whether there are other factors in the specified event 
window, which affect the EMBI spread other than 
the surprise component of the federal funds rates. 
Finally, it is investigated whether the FED’s policy 
surprises also have effects on the exchange rates for 
the examined emerging markets. 
 
 
II. THE DATA AND THE METHODOLOGY 
 
Based on the data availability, 12 emerging 
markets are employed for the sample period between 
31 December 1997 and 20 July 2004. These countries 
are Brazil, Bulgaria, Egypt, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Panama, Peru, Poland, Russia, South Africa, 
Turkey and Venezuela. The FED’s policy surprise 
data were borrowed from Bernanke and Kuttner 
(2004) and Gurkaynak et al. (2005). 
 
As mentioned above, the country-specific EMBI 
spreads are used to analyse the effects of the FED’s 
policy surprises on these countries. Working with the 
EMBI spreads have several advantages. First, since it 
is constructed as excess promised returns over the US 
treasuries, it can be conveniently used as a measure of 
risk for the emerging markets. Second, the liquidity 
and the maturity differences among different 
emerging markets are controlled for. Finally, and 
importantly, as Calvo (2002) argues, it truly reflects 
the ‘risk appetite’ of the foreign investors to invest 
in the emerging financial markets. In that sense, 
the EMBI spread better reflects the changes in the 
external factors, such as a policy surprise of the FED. 
Since an increase in the spread indicates a hike in 
the risk component for the corresponding emerging 
market, a tight policy surprise is expected to increase 
the spread while a loose surprise is expected to 
decrease the spread. In fact, Table 1 displays the four 
possible policy surprise cases and the expected change 
in the EMBI spread. 
 
An event-study approach is followed for two 
reasons. First, as illustrated in MacKinlay (1997), 
such a methodology does not require the imposition 
of a structural model. This non-parametric characteristic 
of the methodology constitutes an advantage 
for a study, where macroeconomic dynamics and 
structures change significantly within and between 
the countries. Second, very rare policy changes can be 
observed but there exists a dense date. As discussed in 
Fatum and Hutchison (2003), time series techniques 
cannot capture the relationship adequately, when the 
variable of interest (federal funds rate in our case) has 
changed only a limited number of times. 
 
 
III. RESULTS 
 
Table 1 shows the four possible cases where a policy 
surprise can be observed. The event are specified 
as the change in the federal funds rate by the FED. 
After the events were classified with respect to those 
four cases, the event study analysis was performed. 
For robustness purposes, both 5-day and 10-day 
event windows are used. While the former is used to 
express the short-term effect of the policy surprise, 
the latter is expected to indicate the long-term 
response of the EMBI spread to that policy surprise. 
In Tables 2–4, the change in the EMBI spreads are 
reported, only when there is a statistically significant 
change with respect to both event windows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As Table 2 shows, there are three events in the 
sample period, where the FED follows a tighter 
policy than expected. It can be seen that only on 
16.05.2000, the EMBI spread for half of the countries 
in the sample changes significantly in the expected 
direction. For the other two cases, the EMBI spread 
is either insensitive or changes in the unexpected 
direction. 
 
We obtain similar results for the cases where the 
FED increases the federal funds rate less than 
the expected. Actually, for the latest two events in 
this group, there are more countries for which the 
EMBI spread moves in the unexpected direction. 
Thus, one can conclude that, when the FED follows 
a tight policy, irrespective of the sign of the 
surprise component, the EMBI spread does not seem 
to react much to such a policy change. 
 
Next, the case, where the FED decreases the federal 
funds rates more than the expected is examine. There 
are nine events to observe, which are reported in 
Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
For 5 events in this category (the first three, the 
fifth and the eighth events), the EMBI spread changes 
significantly at the expected direction for almost all 
of the countries. The negative impact of 11 September 
2001 can also be detected in this table. In the 
consecutive two events following the terrorist activities, 
although there was a negative policy surprise, 
the EMBI spread increased significantly for all of the 
economies in the sample. 
 
Next, Table 5 summarizes the results for the cases 
when the FED follows a less expansionary policy 
than the expected. 
For the second and the fifth events in this category, 
the EMBI spread for almost half of the countries 
change significantly at the expected direction. 
However, the results are far from being clear to 
draw a robust conclusion. 
 
As a result, based on the above findings, the 
perceived risk in the emerging markets seem to 
change significantly at the expected direction, 
only when the FED eases its policy rate more than 
the expected. However, even for that case, the 
negative effects of 11 September should be taken 
into account. 
 
 
 
IV. ROBUSTNESS CHECK AND 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
It can well be argued that, other than the FED’s 
policy surprise, there may be additional factors, 
which affect the EMBI spread during the specified 
event windows. For this purpose, the rank test 
proposed by Cragg and Donald (1997) is employed. 
The procedure treats these other factors as unobserved 
and it tests the null hypothesis of the number 
of factors that cannot be rejected in explaining the 
change in the EMBI spread. As Table 6 shows, the 
null hypothesis that the changes in the EMBI spread 
can be explained only by a single factor can be 
rejected. Thus, one can conclude that the findings of 
the previous section cannot be solely attributed to the 
policy surprises of the FED. 
 
Finally, it can be claimed that the effects of the 
FED’s policy surprises on the risk component of the 
emerging markets can be detected by concentrating 
on another variable. For this purpose, it was 
investigated whether these surprises alter significantly 
the nominal exchange rates for these economies 
during the specified event windows. It could be the 
case that a policy surprise by the FED changes the 
risk perception for the emerging markets, which 
could generate short-term capital flows and alter 
the nominal exchange rates. However, even after 
controlling for the fixed exchange rate regimes for 
the sample period, one could not find a significant 
link from the FED’s policy surprises to the nominal 
exchange rates. It can also be argued that the stock 
returns and the sovereign bond ratings convey 
important information about the policy surprises. 
However, since the EMBI spread partly reflects the 
abnormal returns in the stock prices and the changes 
in the sovereign bond ratings, these variables were 
not included in the analysis. Also, since the main 
interest is to evaluate the risk perception that is 
caused by the policy surprises, the study focused on 
the EMBI spread, which has been used as the 
conventional risk measure in many empirical studies. 
 
Consequently, the above findings suggest that 
the policy surprises of the FED seem to be mostly 
ineffective in changing the country-specific risk 
factor of the emerging market economies. The results 
obtained both from the rank test and the nominal 
exchange rates further support this notion. 
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